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1Introduction
The question of why some firms die while others survive is one of the basic
concerns of business scholars. Survival or long term viability has long been
recognized as a basic goal for a business organization (Barnard 1947, Dertouzos et al.
1989). Survival is, at least in the long term, a prerequisite for success in other terms,
such as market share and profitability.
The survival of firms has traditionally been studied indirectly through economics
research on industry business cycles and analysis of declining industries (see, for
instance, Lieberman 1990 and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989). Firm survival
has recently been studied more systematically by researchers in strategy and
population ecology. Advocates of population ecology have argued that life chances
of organizations are affected by the population density at time of founding and
throughout the life period of an organization. According to this argument,
organizations founded during periods of high density have persistently higher age-
specific rates of mortality than those founded during periods of low population
density (Carroll and Hannan 1989, Hannan and Freeman 1988). In other words, a
firm entering a crowded field has lower chance of survival than one entering a less
competitive field. Population ecologists have not only studied the effect of density
on the risk profile of an organization, but also on the founding rate of new
organizations. Currently, this research argues that the effect of density over birth
and death of organizations varies over time (Carroll and Swaminathan,
forthcoming). In a related stream of literature, researchers in strategy have proposed
that a firm's survival is linked to factors such as entry timing (Mitchell 1991) and
financial strength (Willard and Cooper 1985).
We argue that the economic, population ecology, and strategy perspectives on firm
survival must be complemented by a body of literature that has studied similar
phenomena from the point of view of technology evolution and cycles (Utterback
and Abernathy 1975, Abernathy and Utterback 1978, Utterback and SuArez 1992).
The hypothesis we intend to test is that the competitive environment of an
industry, and therefore the survival of its firms, is substantially affected by the
evolution of the technology on which an industry is based, and particularly by the
emergence of what Utterback and Abernathy (1975) termed a "dominant design."
An implication of this idea is that population density could be thought of as being a
reflection of underlying technological changes that shape the form and level of
competition, the attractiveness of entry, and ultimately the structure of an industry.
In this paper we explore the feasibility of our claims by applying survival analysis to
data from six industries, concentrating on one specific hypothesis derived from the
model of technological evolution advocated here. The results suggest that the
emergence of a dominant design in an industry has a strong and significant effect on
firms' survival. The results also lend additional support to some of the above-
mentioned hypotheses of economists, strategists and population ecologists regarding
firms' survival.
What is a Dominant Design?
The point of departure for our work is the idea that dominant designs occur which
shift the terms of competition in an industry.l We hypothesize that the peak of the
total population curve for any industry manufacturing assembled products in the
United States will occur around the year in which a dominant design emerges in
that industry. A dominant design has the effect of enforcing standardization so that
production economies can be sought. Effective competition can then take place on
the basis of cost as well as product performance (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). A
dominant design will embody the requirements of many classes of users of a
particular product, even though it may not meet the needs of a particular class to
quite the same extent as would a customized design. Nor is a dominant design
necessarily the one which embodies the most extreme technical performance. A
dominant design will, however, represent a milestone or transition point in the life
of an industry. Table 1 provides the sources from which we have identified and
surmised dates of the dominant designs for each industry considered in this paper.
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3TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE (d. d. dates)
We think that the emergence of a dominant design is the result of a fortunate
combination of technological, economic, and organizational factors. A dominant
design is not always that design which has greatest "technological sweetness." The
notion of dominant design is related to the notion of a"standard" which has
received a great deal of attention in the literature lately. However, a standard is seen
largely as a the result of a battle among different technical alternatives (such as
different computer architectures), as opposed to the broader notion we have in
mind with the dominant design concept. When standards are defined broadly, such
as "that which is accepted for current use through authority, custom or general
consent" (Hemenway 1975), the two concepts come closer together. In such cases,
and by implication, a dominant design becomes the industry standard or, for
complex assembled products with many parts, embodies a collection of related
standards. The notion of dominant design as industry standard opens the door for
factors other than technology to influence the adoption of a given design as
dominant, in particular:
* possession of collateral assets
* industry regulation and government intervention
* strategic maneuvering at the firm level
* existence of bandwagon effects or network externalities in the industry
The evolution of technology seems related to each of the above factors in important
ways. Collateral or co-specialized assets (Teece 1986) seem to have a two-way
relationship with the emergence of a dominant design. On the one hand, a firm in
possession of collateral assets such as market channels, brand image, and customer
switching costs will have some advantage vis a vis its competitors in terms of
enforcing its product as the dominant design. The experience of IBM in the
4personal computer industry is a case in point. On the other hand, the value of
collateral assets to a firm will be greater after a dominant design is in place. That is,
there are more incentives for a firm to acquire collateral assets after it knows its
design has become dominant. Thus, the opposite relationship may also hold: a
dominant design will tend to stimulate the creation or acquisition of collateral
assets, which in turn will strengthen its dominance.
Industry regulation often has the power to enforce a standard, and thus define a
dominant design. For instance, the FCC's approval of the RCA television broadcast
standard worked to the advantage of RCA by establishing its design as dominant for
the television industry. The role of the government in the emergence of a
dominant design need not be restricted to regulation. Government purchases of a
product in the early stages of an industry, for instance, may tilt the balance in favor
of the firm or firms producing it, and make this product more likely to become the
dominant design of the industry. Given the importance of industry standards to the
fate and prosperity of firms in an industry, government decisions that favor a given
design often tend to be accompanied by a political battle among the firms involved.
At the firm level, and apart from technology itself, there are also factors that can
affect the emergence of a dominant design. The type of strategy followed by a firm
with respect to its product vis a vis that of competitors may determine which firm's
product becomes dominant. This is what Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom
(1991) have called "strategic maneuvering." Indeed, VCRs are a crisp example of the
importance of strategy. One of the reasons why the VHS system backed by JVC
swept the VCR industry instead of Sony's Betamax is the different strategies
followed by these two firms. While JVC followed an "humble" strategy establishing
alliances first in Japan and then in Europe and the U.S., Sony stressed reputation
and deliberately avoided alliances or contracts to be an OEM supplier. According to
Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom, it was primarily JVC's strategy, and not
technological advantages, initial collateral assets, or government regulation that
finally made VHS the dominant design in the industry. In fact JVC was a late-
comer, and until the mid seventies it lagged technologically.
5Prior to the appearance of a dominant design economies of scale will have little
effect, because a large number of variants of a product will be produced by the many
competing entrants in an industry with each producing at relatively small scale.
Once a dominant design is created, economies of scale can come in to play with
powerful effect, leading to rapid growth of those firms which most competently
master the development of products based on the dominant design, to the
detriment of those firms which are slower to adapt. In general, we think that
economies of scale are of primary importance after a dominant design is in place. In
other words traditional microeconomic arguments hold more weight following the
date of a dominant design. Our view is that traditional economic assumptions
about economies of scale are much more appropriate to the period following a
dominant design than to the period of experimentation and creative turbulence
which precedes it.
A notable exception to the previous statement is provided by cases in which
significant bandwagon effects or "network externalities" exist in the industry.
Positive network externalities arise when a good is more valuable to a user the
more users adopt the same good or compatible ones (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Tirole
1988). Thus, in the presence of bandwagon effects, volume sales and economies of
scale will indeed play a major role in the determination of a dominant design.
Firms which are able to achieve larger scale more quickly than their competitors
may have a better chance of winning the race to settle the standard.2 Moreover, the
impact of strategic maneuvering at the firm level on the determination of the
industry's dominant design is greatly enhanced by the existence of bandwagon
effects in the industry. In the presence of bandwagon effects, strategic maneuvering
is a powerful force driving the emergence of a dominant design, as the case of VCRs
described above illustrates.
How Does a Dominant Design Occur?
6How does technology evolve so that a given design becomes the dominant one?
Prior to the appearance of a dominant design many of its separate features may be
tried in varied products which are either custom designed or designed for a
particular and demanding market niche. The turbulent competitive process
through which many firms enter and some leave an industry may be seen as a
process of experimentation, with each product introduction viewed as a new
experiment on user preference (Klein 1977). Performance dimensions will tend to
be many and highly varied and can often be incommensurate prior to the
occurrence of a dominant design. As a product evolves certain features will be
incorporated, subsuming the related performance dimensions into the design.
With the appearance of the dominant design the product can be described by a few
related and commensurable dimensions. A dominant design then, is synthesized
from more fragmented technological innovations introduced independently in
prior products and tested and often modified by users of those prior products.
A few examples may help clarify this idea. Early versions of the typewriter were able
to produce only capital letters. The addition of lower case letter and a shift key was
at first a specialized feature. Numbers and tabulation were similarly derived. The
earliest typewriters marked on a paper held inside the machine. "Visible typing",
with the paper in view of the operator, similarly began as an attraction of just a few
models. These features were later synthesized in the Underwood Model 5, which
was to become the exemplar of the dominant typewriter design in 1906. Who today
could imagine typing without seeing the text, easily shifting to capital letters, or
easily entering numbers and aligning columns? These are no longer serious issues
or advertised as advantages of one or another manufacturer's product. They are
subsumed within the dominant design established by Underwood. Yet within
recent memory the Apple II personal computer produced only 40 columns of capital
letters. The ability to use 80 columns, to type in upper and lower case or to add a
numeric keypad were all features to be purchased from different vendors and
installed by the proud owner! Users of even large computer systems patiently
embedded control characters in the text of various editing and word processing
programs until the innovation of the WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get)
7display at Xerox PARC, later adopted in the Macintosh, allowed users to easily
change type styles and sizes in a fascinating analogy with visible typing.
Data
To test the hypothesis of concern here we will build on and expand data presented
in Utterback and Sudrez 1992, to analyze the automobile, typewriter, transistor,
electronic calculator, television, and picture tube industries. For each industry, a
complete list of all participating firms was made, indicating years of entry and exit
for each firm. The population density of the industry year by year was computed
from these data, as well as an industry rank of entry timing. For those industries
where data were available, we included industry sales and annual sales growth in
the dataset.
A large number of participants are present in each industry's history. For instance, a
total of 121 firms entered the television industry between 1939 and the late 1980s. In
the calculator industry, our least-populated example, 37 firms entered between 1962
and 1974. We note that our data sets only include American firms.3
As an example, the data for the typewriter industry are summarized in Figure l(a).
These data show a pattern typical for each of the industries studied. A wave of
entering firms in the early stages of the industry's growth is followed by a wave of
exits (mergers and failures). The upper line in Figure 1(a) is simply the sum of
entries and exits, and thus shows the total number of active firms in the typewriter
industry in any given year. The curve of total number of firms in an industry at any
given year (cumulative entry minus exit) is shown in Figure lb for all the industries
in the sample. Figure lb shows that the basic pattern of firm participation is quite
similar even for industries which begin almost a century apart.
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Hypotheses and Method
We believe that a firm's probability of surviving through time will be directly
affected by a firm's entry timing vis a vis the evolution of technology in the
industry. In particular, we hypothesize that the probability of survival will tend to
be greater for firms entering the industry before the emergence of a dominant design
than for firms entering after it. The period following the dominant design will be
marked by a wave of exiting firms made up of both early entrants not able to master
all aspects of the technology and those firms unlucky enough to enter following the
dominant design as well. The development by incumbents of collateral assets and
economies of scale (due to increased production after a dominant design) will
represent significant barriers to entry for firms that venture to enter the industry
after a dominant design. Moreover, strong patent positions may have been
established by earlier entering firms that are difficult for later entrants to completely
circumvent. Our view in this respect is clearly consistent with the work of Burton
Klein (1977), who suggests a profound connection between industry structure and
technological change in his seminal work on dynamic economics.
An alternative hypothesis would be that firms entering before a dominant design is
established will have lower chances for survival. While firms entering after a
dominant design is established face difficulties as late entrants in overcoming entry
barriers, firms entering before will face a high chance of choosing the wrong design.
Why do we suppose that firms entering during a period of experimentation will do
better than those which enter after a commercially successful design has emerged? 4
What are the circumstances under which early entry will be easier, and what are
those which might auger against our hypothesis?
9In brief, we presume that during a period of experimentation none of the
competitors introducing a new product will have important collateral assets. We
assume that entry can occur in a small, performance oriented niche, and therefore
there will be modest or no scale barriers to entry. Simple and general production
processes are expected to be readily available. The net result of these expectations is
that entry will require only moderate capital investment, but will require a high
degree of labor skills and flexibility. In essence the advantages of early entrants will
flow from their ability to quickly introduce many new products or variants and to
learn at a rapid rate from close connections and feedback from users. These ideas
flow directly from Utterback and Abernathy (1975), Abernathy (1978) and Abernathy
and Utterback (1978). Once a dominant design is established there are several factors
which will make it difficult for a new entrant to simply imitate that design.
Collateral assets such as market knowledge, distribution networks and reputation
which have been developed to some degree by earlier entrants will take on
increasing importance as the terms of competition shift. Specialized processes
developed by the earlier entrants will become increasingly important sources of
advantage. Barriers to entry from experience effects, or dynamic economies of scale,
and ordinary scale economies will begin to come into play against new entrants. At
the same time established firms challenged by the new entrants will suffer from
various forms of inertia. For example, firms producing bias-ply tires were
discouraged from entering the radial tire business both by the fear of cannibalizing
their own sales and by original equipment purchasers whose automotive
suspensions were tuned to the older tire design (Denouel, 1980). Similarly, Clayton
Christensen (1992) argues persuasively that established firms failed to master each
successive generation of Winchester disc drive technology through being too
wedded to existing customer demands and not attentive enough to the emerging
demands of manufacturers of smaller computers. Henderson and Clark (1990) give
a powerful example from the electronic capital goods sector in which established
firms are hampered by being wedded to the wrong product technology.
For cases in which there are strong network externalities, we do not expect the above
arguments to completely apply. Langlois (1992) argues that in the case of the IBM
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personal computer, for example, the dominance of a standard increased entry in the
industry, since makers of clones could enter without the investment needed to
insure adequate software. For cases in which industry standards may differ from
standards set based on technical qualities alone, Langlois further argues that the
creation of a standard may open up the possibility of new entry by reducing
consumer uncertainty. In our own data the adoption of the RCA broadcast standard
for television presents just such a case, and entry does indeed increase rapidly for a
brief period after the adoption of that standard.
Non-assembled products usually violate the assumption that simple and general
production processes are readily available. In cases where specialized process
knowledge is vital for entry we expect that established firms will be more successful
than newcomers. This again follows directly from arguments in Utterback and
Abernathy (1975) who limit the concept of dominant design to relatively complex
assembled products. Finally, one might speculate that the arguments above may not
apply to firms having immense financial power and collateral assets such as the
Japanese conglomerates or IBM.
The focus of this paper is to try to determine whether entry prior to or after the
emergence of a dominant design in the industry affects a firm's survival profile.
Survival statistics are presented in order to test the hypothesis that pre-dominant
design entry involves lower risk of failure than post-dominant design entry. For
each industry, two types of analyses were performed: non-parametric estimates of
survival curves for a population stratified in two groups, and a more elaborate
analysis adding control variables using Cox regressions (Cox and Oakes 1984). Basic
definitions about the statistics used in this paper are reported below for those readers
not familiar with the techniques.
Survival analysis is a collection of techniques developed primarily in the field of
biostatistics to address the problem of censored data. A given data case is censored
when the event under study (exit from the industry in our case) does not occur
during the period of study. In this paper, the survival time of a firm is defined as
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the total number of (consecutive) years that a firm was active in an industry, i.e. the
year of exit minus the year of entry. The survival function, S(t) is defined as the
probability that a firm survives (t) years or longer. The survival function is given as
a probability ranging between 0 and 1.0 where S(t) = P(T>t). By definition S(t) = 1
for t = 0, and S(t) = 0 for t=oo; therefore survival functions necessarily decline over
time as exits occur. The hazard function, h(t), gives the probability that a case will
experience the event (exit from the industry) in a small time interval, given that it
has survived until the beginning of that time interval. The hazard function
registers changes in the slope of the (log) survivor function (for a more detailed
review see Singer and Willett 1991, who discuss applications to social sciences. For
technical details, see Lee 1980, or Cox and Oakes 1984).
Non-Parametric Analysis of the Data
As an exploratory step, we computed nonparametric estimates of the survival
distributions in our data. For each industry in our sample, the population was
divided into two groups: those firms which entered before the emergence of the
dominant design, and those which entered afterwards. 5 For each sub-group,
survival and hazard function were estimated, and the corresponding likelihood
ratios for testing the homogeneity of the curves across strata were calculated.
If our hypothesis regarding entry pre or post dominant design is true, we would
expect the following:
The survival function of the pre-dominant design entrants sub-group will
always lie above that of the post-dominant design entrants.
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* The hazard function of the post-dominant design entrants sub-group
will lie above that of the pre-dominant design entrants, particularly
during the first years of a firm's existence.
Figure 2 presents the survival and hazard curves for typewriters, as a case in point.
Part (a) in Figure 2 depicts the survival function in the industry, stratified by entry
timing (pre or post dominant design). Note that the two curves are markedly
different and that, as expected, the survival function for post-dominant design
entrants always lies below that of the pre-dominant design entrants. The difference
is indeed dramatic. For instance, the probability of surviving ten years or more in
the typewriter industry was around 0.70 for firms that entered before the dominant
design, whereas the same probability was only 0.20 for post-dominant design
entrants. 6
Part (b) in figure 2 displays the hazard functions of the two sub-populations. There
is again a sharp difference between the curves. The conditional probability of failure
is always greater for firms that entered after the dominant design. For instance, the
probability that a firm will die in its 10th year of existence, provided that it has
survived until then, is less than 0.05 for pre-dominant design entrants. The same
probability is almost three times as great (0.14) for firms that entered the industry
after the dominant design. The two hazard functions also present very different
patterns. That of the pre-dominant design entrants basically fluctuates around the
0.05 level, rising at first, then decreasing, and rising again. In contrast, the
conditional probability of failure for post-dominant design entrants increases
steadily over time. As time goes by, it gets more and more difficult for these late
entering firms to survive. The gap between the hazard functions of the two sub-
populations widens over time. Indeed, at age 25, the conditional probability of
failure was almost 0.20 for firms that entered after the dominant design, whereas it
was slightly above 0.05 for pre-dominant design entrants.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE (typewriters)
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The typewriter example conforms most closely to our hypothesis, and clearly
illustrates the general pattern that we find in the rest of the industries in our
sample. In all but one of these industries, the survival functions for firms that
entered the industry before the dominant design lie above those of post-dominant
design entrants. The differences between the curves of both sub-populations in each
industry, although not as dramatic as in the typewriter case, are often significant.
Table 2 shows the results of the Wilcoxon test of equality over strata for typewriters
and the rest of the industries in our sample. The null hypothesis in all these tests is
that the two survival functions (for pre and post dominant design entrants) are
indeed the same. For the case of typewriters, we can reject the null hypothesis (P=
0.0001). Overall, in all but two of the six cases considered here the null hypothesis
that the two curves come from the same population can be rejected.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE (Wilcoxon test)
Cox Proportional Hazard Models
The nonparametric analysis presented in the last section does not allow for the
inclusion of control variables. It could be argued that the observed differences in the
curves for each sub-group are the reflection of differences in the value of variables
not contemplated in the previous analysis, and that these variables have no
relationship with a firm's entry timing vis a vis the emergence of a dominant
design in the industry. Also, our characterization of pre- and post-dominant design
entry may be too simplistic. One would expect that the effect of entry on the
survival profile will vary depending on how long before or after the dominant
design a firm enters the industry. It may be less risky to enter an industry only one
year after the emergence of a dominant design than to do it a decade later.
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In order to address these issues we performed further analyses using the technique
of proportional hazards modeling presented by Cox (1972). This technique uses
hazard (actually a logarithmic transformation of hazard given that raw hazards are
bounded to be non-negative) as the outcome variable. For each industry in our
sample, a relationship can be stated between the hazard profile and the explanatory
and control variables.
First the dummy variable used in the last section (pre- or post-dominant design
entry) can be replaced by two continuous variables measuring how many years
before or after a dominant design a firm entered the industry (YRBEFDD and
YRAFTDD). The variable YRBEFDD registers the difference between the dominant
design date and the actual entry year for those cases where a firm enters before the
dominant design in the industry; it is set to zero for post-dominant design entrants.
The variable YRAFTDD registers the difference between actual entry year and the
dominant design date for those firms entering after the dominant design date; it is
set to zero for pre-dominant design entry.7 Next, data on four additional variables
can be used to control for alternative hypotheses regarding firms' survival which
have been proposed by researchers in strategy, economics, and population ecology
(these were mentioned in the introduction). Gathering data on control variables
was not an easy task in some of the industries, as it often involved going back
several decades. In general, the older the industry the more difficult it was to obtain
reliable data for the analysis. For each industry we tried to obtain data on the
following variables below. We were able to obtain complete data sets for the
television and automobile industry; for the other industries, data on industry sales
and sales growth proved too difficult to gather or too unreliable to be used in the
analysis.
· Industry sales at the year of entry by a firm (sales in M 1982 dollars), INDSLENT.
· Industry sales growth rate (annual) at the year of a firm's exit from the industry,
ISLGWEX.
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· Population density (number of firms in the industry) at the year of a firm's entry,
EDENSITY.
· Industry rank of entry timing (we used a natural logarithmic transformation),
LNENRANK.
A general model can be written as:
In h(t) = B(t) + B i YRBEFDD + + B2 YRAFTDD + B 3 INDSLENT + B4 ISLGWEX +
+ B5 EDENSITY + B6 LNENRANK
The variable EDENSITY tests the effect of the density dependence argument
introduced by population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman 1988; Carroll and
Hannan, 1989). One would generally expect a higher hazard profile (a "riskier life")
for firms entering the industry during periods of high population density (Carroll
and Swaminathan, forthcoming). Extensions of the original density dependence
argument also allow for a reduction in the hazard profile as density increases (see,
for instance, Barnett 1990). The latter case is said to exist when "mutualism" is
present, i.e. when the existence of more organizations in the population improves
the organizations' survival profile. As our sample deals with firms that directly
compete for market share, we expect competition rather than mutualism in our
analysis.
The variable INDSLENT captures the effect of market size at a firm's entry on the
hazard profile of that firm, an idea also related to the postulates of population
ecologists and related research. One would expect a lower hazard profile for firms
that enter the industry in years where the market is larger. Indeed, Barnett and
Amburgey (1990) found that industry sales reduced failure rates in the telephone
industry. The variable ISLGWEX captures the effect of business cycles in the hazard
profile of firms. One would expect a firm's probability of failure to be higher the
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weaker the industry growth rate is during the last year of a firm's existence. Finally,
LNENRANK captures the effect of entry timing on the performance of firms, along
the lines of previous studies in strategy such as those by Mitchell (1989, 1991) and
Lambkin (1988). Note that the entry timing effect is different from that of pre- and
post-dominant design entry.
Table 3 below presents the result of fitting a simple model of log-hazard with
YRBEFDD and YRAFTDD as the only predictors. This analysis is already an
improvement over the nonparametric analysis of the previous section, given that
YRBEFDD and YRAFTDD are continuous variables measuring the effect on the log-
hazard profile of an additional year of early (or late) entry by a firm respect to the
dominant design date for the industry. The parameters of YRBEFDD and
YRAFTDD are highly significant in all cases and as expected, they are always more
significant than the dummy predictor of pre- or post-dominant design entry (this is
not reported in the table). The antilogarithms of these coefficients represent
numerical multipliers of risk per unit difference in the predictor (Singer and Willett
1991). Table 3 shows that entry prior to the dominant design consistently reduces a
firm's risk of failure. For each year earlier than a firm enters respect to the
dominant design date (a higher value for YRBEFDD), its hazard profile is shifted
down 6 to 15 percentage points depending on the industry considered. Entry after
the dominant design (a value greater than zero for YRAFrDD) has a more ambigous
effect in terms of shifting the hazard profile. Post-dominant design entry increases
risk of failure in one industry, has almost no effect on two industries, and actually
decreases risk in the picture tube industry.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE (Simple Cox Regression - Four Industries)
In most cases, the strong and significant effects of YRBEFDD and YRAFrDD do not
vanish when we add control variables. Table 5 is a summary table reporting the
be. -:fitting models in each industry after adding the control variables. Only in the
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television industry the best-fitting model is one that does not include the variables
YRBEFDD and YRAFTDD.8 With only a few exceptions the signs of the coefficients,
and their implications with respect to shifts in the hazard profile, are the expected
ones. In terms of the mechanics of the analysis, for each industry a taxonomy of
models was tested, and the significance of a given variable in a model was calculated
by dropping the variable in question from a model that included it, and performing
a "decrement to chi-square" test between the two models. Appendices 1 and 2 report
the results of all fitted models in each industry. The automobile case is discussed
below as an example.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE (Summary of Cox Regressions )
In order to illustrate the interpretation of the coefficients in a Cox model, consider
Table 5 below which shows a taxonomy of models fitted for the case of the
automobile industry. The table shows that the significance of YRBEFDD and
YRAFrDD, or the sign of their effect on hazard is not affected by the addition of
more covariates. The best-fitting model is model seven, which includes all
variables. 9 For the best-fitting model, the antilogarithms of parameter estimates are
shown in parentheses.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE (Cox Regression - Auto)
Note that all parameters in the automobile case present the expected sign. The
hazard profile of a firm is shifted upward (i.e. a firm has a higher conditional
probability of failure) by increments in YRAFTDD and EDENSITY. For instance, for
each increment in population density at any given year, the hazard profile of a firm
entering the industry that year goes up by 4.3 percent. Note, incidentally, that the
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unexpected negative sign for the coefficient of YRAFIDD from the simple model
(Table 3) changes to a positive coefficient when we add the controls. Entry after the
dominant design now increases the hazard profile, as we expected. The hazard
profile is shifted downward by higher values of YRBEFDD, INDSLENT and
ISLGWEX. The earlier the entry vis a vis the dominant design, the bigger the
market early in the life of a firm, or the stronger the industry growth rate at a firm's
final year, the lower the conditional probability of failure of such a firm.
Research Agenda
The analysis presented above opens a broad agenda for future research. First, the
concept of a dominant design dearly needs to be specified more rigorously. We
think we have moved a step forward here by considering the emergence of a
dominant design as a combination of technological, economic, and organizational
factors.
There is also further work to do in terms of finding some sensible metrics to narrow
down the search for a dominant design date. This is probably the most challenging
task ahead. Some authors have used tautological measures to determine a
dominant design, such as market share (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). A better
measure, for instance, might be a notable increase in licensing activity during
several years by a given firm or by a group of firms with products based on the same
core technology. Licensing data, i.e. whether a particular product or process starts to
capture a large share of the industry's licensing activity at some time may represent
a good way to shed light on the occurrence of a dominant design. We expect that
this would be particularly true in cases in which there are strong network
externalities. More generally we need to discover a way of keeping track of the
different features of divfferent models of competing products to see if these begin to
stabalize just prior to the synthesis of a dominant design. Sanderson and Uzumeri
(1990) have provided one possibly fruitful approach based on analysis of product
literature and specifications.
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Our sample has been limited. More industries, especially contemporary ones, are
needed if our hypotheses are to be more generally tested. We also need to study
counter-examples to our model. In the VCR industry, for instance, the post-
dominant-design period seems to have been associated with an increase in the entry
of firms into the industry. By studying cases like this, perhaps we could isolate the
factors or characteristics of an industry to create a model more likely to be valid.
Finally, the present analysis could also be expanded by adding more firm-specific
control variables. l0
Building upon Teece (1986), we suggested that the dominant design concept be
related to issues such as collateral assets, network externalities, industry regulation,
and firms' strategic maneuvering. The importance of relating the concepts of
dominant design and standards was also stressed. There are still many issues that
need to be addressed in future research. The specific effect of each of the mentioned
factors on the emergence of a dominant design needs to be sorted out, as well as the
conditions for each of them to play a greater or lesser role.
Conclusions
This paper has shed light on relationships between technology, firm strategy,
industry structure, and the competitiveness of firms in an industry. The results
show that the dominant design-technological evolution model proposed by
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) has clear implications for the fate of firms entering
an industry. This model can complement postulates of other streams of thought
such as those of population ecology, strategy, and economics, and together these
theories can better explain the survival characteristics of firms. Work on strategic
management has often neglected technological change. These results show that by
explicitly including technology as a dynamic and strategic variable we can enhance
our understanding of firms' survival potential and success.
III
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Footnotes:
1 As Teece 1986 and others have noted, the dominant design model is better suited to mass markets where consumer
tastes are relatively homogeneous. Also, our claims only extend to assembly manufacturing industries. As Utterback
(1992) has argued elsewhere, the hypotheses stated here are of less relevance to the case of non-assembled products
such as rayon or glass, in which innovation in the production process is an earlier and more central theme.
2 Note, though, that a firm can achieve the same result by giving away most of the production of its product design to
third parties rather than producing it only in-house. This instance of strategic maneuvering was present in the VCR
industry.
3 Several of the data on entry and exit dates have been taken from others' oriinal work: typewriters from Engler
(1969), automobiles from Fabris (1966), transistors from Tilton (1971), and casculators from Majumdar (1977). The
authors gathered data on television sets and picture tubes from archival sources.
4 The authors thank the anonymous referee who raised this question.
5 Our data set at this point is composed of the following variables for each industry:
Firm Name of the firm
Entry Year of entry to the industry
Exit Year of exit from the industry
Time Number of years that the firm operated in the industry
(one in cases where entry and exit are in the same year)
Censor 0 when case is right-censored, 1 otherwise (see below).
Pre_Post 0 if firm entered the industry before the dominant design,
1 if it entered after the dominant design
6 We think that the liability of newness argument may hold better in pr-dominant design periods, given that entry in
these periods is in general "less risky" than post-dominant design entry. Thus, firms entering an industry before the
dominant design will have the hardest time during their first years of existence (typically, they have limited financial
resources) but, if they manage to survive the first years, their chances of surviving become somewhat greater. The
picture may be different after the dominant design has been established, for incumbents have created significant
barriers to entry. Firms that venture to enter in this post-dominant design phase will probably make sure in advance
that they have enough resources to try to compensate for the incumbents advantages (that is, there is some type of
selection bias in terms of the kind of firms that enter in this phase). Thus, these post-dominant design entrants may have
a "safer" life during their first years in the industry, because they came well endowed. As their resources are depleted
during their first years in the industry and as the advantages of predominant design incumbents prove difficult to
overcome, their probability of failure begin to rise. This reasoning may explain the apparent divergence in our work
and that related to the liability of newness, but we need to explore this further in the future.
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer who suggested we use two variables measuring the 'distance' from dominant
design. Originally, we had created a single variable, YRFROMDD, taking negative or positive values depending
whether a firm entered before or after the dominant design. Having two variables (YRBEFDD and YRAFDD) allow
us to relax the restriction that the effect of entry on hazard is the same for both pre- and post-dominant design entrants.
8 We believe this may be partly caused be the fact that our early data for the television industry are not as reliable as
those for other industries, as data for the first few years of the industry were unavailable.
9 Note that we have included entry density in the best-fitting model even though this variable is not significant because
several of our variables are correlated.
1 0 For examples of other papers that have considered the effect of multiple covariates on survival, see Willard and
Cooper (1985) or Mitchell (1991). Note that both these studies have only considered one industry. In fact, Willard
and Cooper considered only the 19 largest firms in their study of color'TV (and also used more traditional statistical
techniques than those we employ here). -None of these studies tested the hypotheses derived from the dominant design
model as a predictor of survival.
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Table 1. A List of Dominant Designs By Industry
Industry Dominant Design Date Source
Typewriter Underwood's Model 5; 1906 Engler, 1969
Hess' innovations
Automobile
Television
TV Tubes
Transistor
All Steel, Closed body
21-inch set; adoption of
RCA's technical standards
All-glass, 21 inch tube
Planar Transistor
1923
1952
1956
1959
Fabris, 1966;
Abernathy 1978
John Rydz interview;
Television Factbook
1949-89
John Rydz interview;
Television Factbook
1949-89
Tilton, 1971; Braun
& MacDonald, 1978
Calculator on a chip 1971Electronic Calculator Majumdar, 1977
Table 2. Nonparametric Analysis - Wilcoxon Test of Equality over Strata - Survival
Functions in Six Industries.
Industry Chi2 D.F. P-Value Decision at 0.05 level
Typewriters 26.849 1 0.0001 Reject Null Hypothesis
Automobile 4.295 1 0.0382 Reject Null Hypothesis
Television 15.976 1 0.0001 Reject Null Hypothesis
Picture Tube 0.0161 1 0.8989 Can't Reject
Transistor 0.093 1 0.7601 Can't Reject
Calculators 4.9334 1 0.0263 Reject Null Hypothesis
Pre-DD Post-DD
Null Hypothesis: S(t) = (t)
Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazards Regression - Five Industries
Model: ln h(t) = B + B 1 YRFROMDD
Industry N B1 e Shift in Hazard Profile
Typewriters 83 0.063*** 1.065 h shifts up 6.5%(t)
Automobiles 95 0.039*** 1.040 h(t) shifts up 4.0%
Television 121 0.040*** 1.041 h) hifts up 4.1%(t) s
Picture Tube 105 0.076*** 1.079 h(t) shifts up 7.9%
Transistor 45 0.075 1.078 h shifts up 7.8%
h(t) s
* p < 0.05p < 0.01
· ** D< 0.001
Note: the analysis could not be performed for the calculator industry, as all but a few firms entered the industry before
the dominant design.
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Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazards Regression - Automobile Industry
Model YRFROMDD INDSLENT ISLGWEX EDENSITY LNENRANK -2LogL
____________________________________________________________
599.95
-0.0001*
-0.0177**
0.019**
0.297
-0.0001**
-0.0001**
(0.999)
-0.0185***
-0.0197***
(0.980)
593.62
591.11
591.40
598.27
583.47
573.930.019**
(1.019)
VIII 0.0000 -0.0156* 0.026*** 588.34
B.
In model VII, the best-fitting model, antilogarithms of parameter estimates ( e are shown in parentheses.
p < 0.05
*** p< 0.01
p < 0.001
I 0.039***
11 0.086***
mI 0.049***
0.026***IV
V
VI
0.021***
0.104***
VII 0.107***
(1.113)
III
Table 5. Cox Proportional Hazards Regression for the Typewriter Industry
Model YRFROMDD EDENSITY LNENRANK -2LogL
I 0.0632*** 528.66
(1.0636)
II 0.0463*** 543.93
m 0.0617*** 0.0305 528.62
IV 0.0672* -0.0533 528.64
V 0.0797* 0.0146 -0.3174 528.34
B.
In model I, the best-fitting model, antilogarithms of parameter estimates ( e are shown in parentheses.
p < 0.05
** < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
(a) Number of Firms Participating in the Typewriter Industry in the U.S.
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Appendix 1. Cox Proportional Hazards Regression for the Television Industry
Model YRFROMDD INDSLENT ISLGWEX EDENSITY LNENRANK -2LogL
I 0.040*** 892.10
II 0.014 0.0001* 885.78
III 0.035* 0.009* 886.24
IV -0.005 0.5358*** 882.63
V 0.0002*** -0.0164** 878.80
VI -0.0148* 0.5307*** 876.18
(0.985) (1.700)
VII 0.0001 -0.0165** 0.3401* 872.86
VIII -0.044 0.0001 -0.0160** -0.0085 0.6874* 871.11
In model VI, the best-fitting model, antilogarithms of parameter estimates (e are shown in parentheses.
p < 0.05
· < 0.01
p < 0.001
